

The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 2007 enlargement wave: threats and opportunities

Rodica Milena Zaharia
FIBE – ASE, Bucharest

The Common Foreign and Security Policy is the newest and, certainly, the most ambitious project pertaining to the European construction. Following the integration theory, tackled by many authors¹, the political union is considered to be the final stage of the integration process.

Along the years, the European construction has become extremely extrovert, and the integration process has influenced not only the internal aspects of the European Union, but also its relationships developed with the rest of the world. The European integration process has become more consistent, and CFSP has grown to be one of the main pillars of the European Union. EU is trying to define and consolidate its common foreign and security policy in a time of profound and dramatic international changes.

The present paper tries to identify aspects considered to be relevant in an analyze about CFSP and the relation between CFSP, as a vertical axis of the integration process and enlargement, as the horizontal one.

Key words: *security, CFSP, enlargement*

The concept of security has become more and more complex, going beyond the narrow meaning of military balance between two rival sides.

After 1991², the Copenhagen School had a major influence on the academic debates on the problem of security and even of the development of security policies. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and other specialists from the Peace and Conflict Studies Centre of Copenhagen proposed an enlargement of the concept of European security, on the following *five dimensions: military, political, economic, societal and environmental*.

¹ Balassa offers a large analysis of theories and stages of integration in his work *Theory of Economic Integration*, Irwin Homewood, Illinois, 1961

² In 1991, Barry Buzan published at Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, the second edition of his book *People, States and Fear*. The first edition had been issued in 1983, but the international acknowledgement of the Copenhagen School came after the end of the Cold War.

The security of human communities is affected by several factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. *The military security* is concerned with the action on two levels: the offensive and defensive capabilities of states and the perception of states regarding everyone's views. *The political security* is connected with the organizational stability of states, of government systems and of the ideologies which legitimize them. *The economic security* is concerned with the access to resources, markets and capital, necessary to support acceptable levels of welfare and power of the state. *The societal security* involves sustainability, under acceptable evolutionary conditions related to traditional linguistic patterns, to culture and religion, as well as to national customs and identity. *The environmental security* is connected with the maintenance of local and global biosphere as an essential support on which all other human activities depend. These five sectors do not operate separately. Each of them defines a focal aspect of the security problem and a path to organize priorities, but they are all related through a powerful network.³

The theoretical concerns related to defining CFSP⁴ were influenced by the Cold War and the relationships which the EU had to develop with its allies (USA), its enemies (the Soviet Block) and the "Asian threat" (especially China). Furthermore, the EU desire to construct an entity and to become a global entity was facing difficulties related to the fact that it inherited (and we can say it still inherits) the outcome of the World War II: on a military level, Europe was identifying itself especially through NATO, in spite of France's wish to impose a "European (or a French) vision" of the alliance.

The complexity of the international relations after 1989 brought new necessary and important elements in the definition of CFSP. The first was the fall of communism and the disappearance of the communist threat. Instead of a communist block, sufficiently homogeneous from an ideological and political point of view, there appeared new sources of threat: the fragmenting of the Soviet Block and the menace coming from a little controllable space with access to varied weapons, the economic instability of the satellite countries of the former USSR, the division of the former Yugoslavia (maybe the most important element from the CFSP perspective, if we consider Bosnia as the first

³ Barry Buzan in Dr. Dan Dungaiu's *Integrarea euro-atlantica, securitatea regionala si romanii din jurul Romaniei*, www.studiidesecuritate.ro; Translation mine

⁴ Hans-Georg Ehrhart achieved a very interesting study in which he mentions the theoretical approaches which define the CFSP model. Three models were proposed, namely: EU as a civilian power force, starting from the unique situation of the European construction and the values (pre-eminently civilian) it promotes, a model which was supported by theoreticians of the 70s as François Duchene, the model of the militant power (theoreticians like Hedley Bull in the 80s), which started from the fact that a possible abandonment of the NATO umbrella will leave Europe exposed in front of any type of threat, and the model of normative power : "a normative power is characterized by its ability to shape standards of common sense. These norms define the international identity of the EU. Starting from these approaches, Hans - Georg Ehrhart proposes the model of "cooperative security provider", which relies on normativism, appropriateness, inclusiveness, multilevel orientation, multilateralism (Hans - Georg Ehrhart – *What model for CFSP?*, Chaillot Papers, no. 55, oct. 2002, www.isse-eu.org)

failure of CFSP even before the birth of this common policy). To all these were added the challenges launched by the process of globalisation, which emphasized competition coming not only from the recently communist-free East, but mostly from Asia (China, the last bastion of communism, began considerable reforms which in less than a decade led this economy to the top of world nations from the viewpoint of its dynamism—the highest rate of growth) and, let's not forget, from the USA⁵. International terrorism represents another very important element that any security model must take into account, which proves once again that the difficulty in creating CFSP is real.

Europe has searched for answers to some of these problems. The fall of communism allowed the reunion of Germany and the opening toward East, which concluded with the extension without precedent of the European Union. The direction towards market economy of the ex-communist countries helped to the development of financial instruments which led to “a second Marshall Plan” for Central and Eastern Europe, transforming the European Union into the biggest donor of financial assistance in the world. Europe has not abandoned the vertical axis of integration: together with the enlargement, it introduced a unique currency and applied a common monetary policy, it defined the construction of the internal market and made important steps in establishing a common citizenship.

I The history of CFSP

If on an economic level the EU is a giant, we can't say the same thing about it as an entity on a political level. The development of a common foreign policy represented a delicate issue along the years, which was perceived over the decades as a way of renouncement of the member states to their sovereignty and independence attributes.

Although the Rome Treaty made no specific reference to a political union, the efforts to set up a common defence and foreign policy have existed ever since the beginnings of the European construction. We can assess that the development of a common policy concerning foreign politics and common security has known two major stages, namely: the European Political Cooperation (EPC) stage, which is characterized mostly by the Europeans' endeavours to shape a set of coherent principles that could define the new path of politics and security, in an uncertain period on an international level, dominated by the existence of the two ideological systems and the two military blocks on a political and military level; the second stage is the after-Maastricht stage, when the Common Foreign Security Policy was conceived as a second pillar of the EU.

⁵ The USA registered in the 90s one of the longest periods of economic growth which led this nation to the worldwide economic top. The European reaction was pretty modest. Through the Lisbon strategy, the Europeans tried to establish extremely ambitious objectives, such as the one to become the most competitive economy of the world by 2005.

The main stages of the European Political Cooperation can be summarized as such:

➤ In 1950, the Pleven Plan⁶ was proposing the creation of an integrated European army under common command. The plan was the subject of negotiation among the member states of CECO and led to the formation of the European Defence Community, which was not ratified by France and, thus, was never applied.

➤ In the 60s, two ambitious projects were aiming at a tighter political cooperation among the member states, a union of states and a common foreign and defence policy. It was also stipulated the establishment of an independent structure which would ensure the transposition into practice of these measures, as well as the approval of the vote with qualified majority in certain situations. Neither of these initiatives was accepted by the member states.

➤ The Davignon Report of 1970 created the European Political Cooperation to ensure the mutual understanding and to strengthen the solidarity among member states regarding international issues.

➤ Another important historical event was the Copenhagen European Council decision of 1973 which was aiming at establishing common approaches and applying a coherent diplomacy.

➤ The Stuttgart European Council decision of 1983 was advising the inclusion of the political and economic aspects of security in the EPC.

➤ Finally, the Unique European Act of 1986 included in the treaty the European cooperation in the field of foreign politics. During this stage, the foreign politics of West-European countries were subjected to a process of harmonization on the basis of some informal agreements, without permanent official structures.

The birth of CFSP dates since the European Union Treaty (the Maastricht Treaty), in force since 1993 mentions for the first time this policy as the second pillar of the European Union⁷. The following developments which have affected the CFSP could be summarized as such:

⁶ www.europa.eu.int

⁷ Created with the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty) in 1993, Title V replaced EPC with an intergovernmental pillar in the Community structure. Article 11 sets out its five main principles:

- ❖ to safeguard the common values and fundamental interests of the Union;
- ❖ to strengthen the security of the Union;
- ❖ to preserve peace and strengthen international security;
- ❖ to promote international cooperation;
- ❖ to develop democracy and the rule of law, including human rights.

- the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 improved the construction of PESC by extending the number of common instruments and by developing the decision making procedures;
- the Helsinki European Council in 1999 made decisions which consolidated the common defence and security policy;
- Between 2000 and 2004, the European Council reunions developed the plan for the construction of European military and civilian capabilities to solve crises;
- Finally, in 2004, *The Treaty to Create a Constitution for Europe* comprises important articles regarding the development of both the political dimension and the defensive one of CFSP and EDP.

The CFSP is also mentioned in Article 2 of the common provisions of the EU Treaty, which stipulates that one of the Union's objectives is 'to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence...'[3].

Title V constitutes a separate pillar of the European Union, since the way it operates and its intergovernmental nature distinguish it from the traditional pillars of the Community, such as the single market and trade policy. This difference is most striking in the decision-making procedures, which require Member State consensus, whereas in traditional Community areas a majority vote suffices. In addition, the instruments of the CFSP, like those of the third pillar, differ from those of the European Community. The Maastricht Treaty provides the CFSP with the following key instruments:

- ❖ common positions, which require the Member States to implement national policies that comply with the position defined by the Union on a particular issue. One example of coordination can be found in the fight against the illicit traffic in diamonds, as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts which are centered on countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola;
- ❖ joint actions, which are operational actions by the Member States under the auspices of the CFSP. One example is the support for the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to counter terrorist activities emanating from its territories .

The Union may express itself through decisions, the conclusion of international agreements, declarations and contacts with third countries.

Another difference in relation to the first pillar is the less important roles played by the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, which is in stark contrast with their powers in spheres of Community competence. The [Commission's role](#) includes the right to submit legislative proposals and budget execution. It therefore has a certain degree of influence over the formulation and coordination of this 'inter-pillar policy'. The [European Parliament](#) may put questions and recommendations to the Council and it holds an extensive annual debate on the implementation of the CFSP.

It is important to note that although the policy is intergovernmental in nature, there are many actors involved in the process. These include the European Council, the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers, the Political and Security Committee, European correspondents, the CFSP Working Group and CFSP counselors. To these may be added the aforementioned influence of the Commission and the European Parliament. (www.europa.eu.int)

Taking into account the complex nature of the EU, it is not surprising that, as Michael Smith⁸ remarks, there are three levels intertwining in the CFSP:

❖ First of all, the level of the European Community, and, respectively, the economic dimension of the European foreign politics;

❖ Second, we can mention the level of the European Union which, until the Unique European Act of 1986, constituted the unofficial coordination of the foreign politics of the member states in the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process. This direction of development was afterwards made official and actualized by the Treaty regarding the European Union and its modifications, starting with 1992;

❖ The third level is the national one, namely the separate foreign politics of the member states which are more and more influenced by EU's institutionalized foreign policy.

II The economic and the political dimensions of the EU

On an economic level, the European Union has succeeded to impose itself as an entity. The biggest successes were achieved as far as trade is concerned, where, there is no doubt that the European Union is the strongest actor. The trade policy is a common policy which is not coordinated by the member states, but by a communitarian organism, the European Commission. The unique market is valid and the EU has a common monetary policy⁹. The progress at the economic level is extraordinary, which can be proved also with clear figures:

❖ The EU is the biggest trader of the world, owning almost 40% of the global trade. The European Union countries are, otherwise, among the first exporters and importers of the world (in 2004, the biggest exporter in the world was Germany, the European Union having six of its member states in the top ten worldwide exporters). At any rate, the commercial dimension of the EU policies is the most important achievement in the integration plan, considering that during the negotiations, the EU acts through a sin-

⁸ Michael Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalisation of Cooperation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004

⁹ Even if only twelve countries of the twenty-five EU member states are part of the monetary union, there is no doubt that the Euro currency is one of the most powerful currencies in the world. Furthermore, the ten states that adhered in 2004 are already part of the monetary mechanisms meant to ensure the transition towards the unique currency.

gle voice, the one of the European Commission. Paraphrasing the famous statement of Henry Kissinger, the former American secretary of state, *if I want to talk to Europe on the phone, whom do I call*, on a commercial level the answer would be: the European Commission!

❖ The European market is the biggest market in the world, its importance being supported not only by the large number of consumers (over 450 million, in the schema of 25 states), but also by the very high purchase force (the average real GDP per capita in EU25 in 2005 was 24,100 USD).

❖ The European Union countries are among the biggest investors in the world and are also hosting some of the biggest international corporations.

❖ The EU is an important actor on the international political stage as well, even if it does not act “through a single voice”. Two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are European countries (France and Great Britain), four of the G7 members are European countries, EU is the biggest donor of financial assistance and, as a recognition of the role it plays on the international stage, almost every country has diplomatic representatives for EU in Brussels, and EU has set up delegations in over 120 countries.

In terms of its economic dimension, the model that the European Union should follow in the CFSP plan is at the crossroad of two great confrontations: **the internal coercions** which the European construction faces (caused by a multitude of elements, such as: the great number of countries—soon to be 27, the diversity on all aspects—cultural, social, but especially economic, the complicated mechanisms at the level of the Union, which are perceived as more and more burdensome by the European citizens and which push them away from the European institutions, leading to a more and more concerning deficit of democracy) and **the foreign challenges**, related to the terrorist threat, the lagging behind the USA, the more and more aggressive Asian offensive (with China as its main representative). Between these two coercions the EU is trying to define its identity, which is meant to satisfy the member states’ egos, but also to be strong enough to prove itself in front of the other partners.

The European identity in the CFSP plan is difficult enough to sketch, although, paradoxically, of all the “projects “ aimed at deepening the integration, the one related to CFSP is the most approved of by the Europeans (especially the EU15). A reason for this attitude could be determined by the fact that this is the field where few steps have been made and CFSP has not yet achieved a certain level of development that could lead to reaching national sovereignty. Unanimity still represents a fundamental principle concerning the authorization of all actions of the common foreign security policy.

Since the foundation of CFSP, the EU has manifested many weaknesses regarding its foreign politics. An example is the Bosnia conflict, when the lack of reaction of the European leaders allowed the USA to take initiative and act under the auspices of NATO. We can also underline a series of unilateral actions inside the EU, such as Ger-

many's decision to singly recognize Croatia's independence¹⁰, or Greece's unilateral imposition of a blockade against Macedonia motivated by the fact that the latter were using Greek cultural values, or Great Britain's support of the USA position of threatening the Iraqi regime unless they submit their weapons to be inspected by the United Nations¹¹. But maybe the biggest "defeat" of the European Union at the level of its foreign policy was the Iraqi War. The positions of the European leaders were very contradictory: on the one hand there was the group of countries led by France, which repeatedly strengthened their position against American intervention, on the other hand there was the group led by Great Britain, which supported unconditionally and participated with the USA at the formation of an international coalition against Saddam Hussein's regime.

III The enlargement of the EU and the challenges launched by CFSP

The extension in 2004 towards Eastern Europe presented EU with new challenges in its plan of foreign and security policy. The five dimensions of security, identified by the Copenhagen School, are more up-to-date than ever inside the European Union. Additionally, the European citizens seem to grant greater importance to the social and environmental dimensions than to the political and military ones. In a study completed in 2005¹², it was shown that the Europeans are more concerned with global warming than terrorism, which says a lot about the immediate interest related to, for example, the formation of a common security policy. Paradoxically, or maybe not, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, thought of as the most recent CFSP failure, is not related to the rejection of the European idea in general, but to the "old members' fear" of unemployment, immigration and economic crises. In this context, we can say that the Eastern extension has rather brought obstacles in the formation of CFSP. The new members are closer to NATO than the old ones, which entitle the citizens of the 15 countries to consider them as pro-American, rather than pro-European. Furthermore, as it is shown in the study mentioned above, the Europeans have a different understanding of the concept of super-power. According to most Europeans, the status of super-power must not necessarily involve the military dimension. There is a strong preference for the so-called "soft-power", which should be promoted by the EU and which should include the prevalence of the monitoring actions of elections to the prejudice of economic or military sanctions.

¹⁰ There have been voices at the time that considered Germany's recognition of Croatia's independence as a gesture of friendship between former allies.

¹¹ John McCormick, *Understanding the European Union – A concise introduction*, Pelgrave, 1999, p. 208

¹² Transatlantic trends 2005, www.transatlantictrends.org

The NATO affiliation of the new EU member states (from the 2004 extension, as well as the countries that will join the Union on 1st January 2007) creates a certain “discomfort” for Europeans. The present transatlantic relations can be described as being under a state of suspicion nourished by both parties. On the one hand, the United States, prevalent in the security issues and the hegemonic ruling of worldwide affairs, are complaining about the weak contribution of Europeans in NATO and about the fact that they are profiting from the benefits without a proportional effort. On the other hand, the USA are afraid not to be abandoned by the European allies with the construction of PESA, and the EU capacity to lead military actions is perceived as a reduction of the NATO role and as a decoupling from the ally strategy.

As far as the Europeans are concerned, who have traditionally been more reserved concerning the increasing of military expenses to efficiently contribute to the Western defence military capabilities, they wish to play a substantial role in achieving the Western security policy. From a larger perspective, we can notice that internal structural factors are to be blamed for this situation of relationships. The two allies have fragmented political systems in which governments can't control the internal media and in which divergent priorities are developing. There are also different perceptions of threats and risks, political preferences and different perspectives, as well as diverse definitions of national interests¹³. During the last three decades, the technological and military lag of the EU member states (except for Great Britain and France) behind the USA has grown. Starting from this, the American administration gradually adopted a more unilateral approach of military interventions, tending to engage in ad-hoc military coalitions. Additionally, the European Union still does not have, as an entity, the necessary political unity to construct a common armed force. In spite of its increasing global economic and financial power, the European Union cannot yet have a significant global military presence in the case of a conflict, even a diffuse one, such as the fight against terrorism, and even less probable in a war situation. At the same time, the European Union does not have the necessary material resources to form a military force capable of a fast intervention at a global level, simultaneously on several operating fields. At any rate, the EU defence expenses are significantly lower compared to the American ones: around 40% of the American level of expenses for military equipment, including research and development. The situation is identical for the operations led and for the maintenance of the operational forces.

¹³ Ingo Peters, *ESDP as a Transatlantic Issue: Problems of Mutual Ambiguity*, International Studies Review, vol. 6, nr. 3, 2004.

IV Romania's adhesion and CFSP

The European Union extension after 2007 will lead to the re-drawing of the European borders. Romania's Eastern neighbours (Ukraine, The Moldavian Republic) will become both the Western frontier of Russia's "close neighbouring area", and the Eastern border of the "new EU neighbouring area". The new geopolitical context will need an active involvement of Romania in the politics of the "new EU neighbouring area", including in the management of "the latent conflicts" from the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as those from Transnistria. At any rate, Bulgaria's and especially Romania's location in the EU's Eastern neighbouring area represents the biggest challenge for EU's security. The two countries can substantially contribute to applying CFSP through the existent human resources and logistics, as well as through the experience acquired in peace support and regional military cooperation missions, but they also have to mobilize their efforts to ensure an adequate security of their frontiers.

In this context, in spite of some concerns manifested by the European citizens, the 2007 enlargement can take place rather from an impulse of the EU to continue the CFSP construction than from a source of distress. On the other hand, we must not forget that the important economic lag behind manifested by the two countries joining the EU in 2007 in comparison to the rest of the member states can issue a number of delays in the support of different EU initiatives, including on the CFSP axis. The significant differences from the EU25 concerning the GDP per capita (a third), the work productivity, the inflation (in Romania), the trade deficit represent some of the threats against the EU security. The access of the citizens from the two countries to the European workforce market constitutes a reason of worry for the Europeans of EU 15, even if the 2004 enlargement has shown that no important migration took place from the countries which became members two years ago. The fear of the Europeans in the 15 states which signed the Maastricht Treaty against the newcomers is not motivated solely by the drawbacks created by the Eastern citizens, but mostly by the inability of the EU 15 to solve the imperative social problems EU is facing, especially unemployment. This anxiety is fueled by the fact that many Romanians are working in countries like Spain, Germany or Italy in fields like agriculture and constructions, giving the (almost always false) impression that the Easterners have come to take up the jobs of the citizens in the respective countries¹⁷.

¹⁷ In fact, the central European countries compete more often for projects against distant low-wage rivals such as China and Brazil, and all Europe benefits from central Europe's success. But still, some industrial capacity is shifting directly from the old to the new members. And some workers from central Europe are indeed entering western labour markets, often illicitly, since most EU governments have bowed to public opinion by closing their job markets to the newcomers. Such migration usually helps local economies, but it still upsets local interests (*"Is the EU losing the will to enlarge itself"*, The Economist, April 2005, www.economist.com).

Comparing the threats feared by the EU citizens in the context of the 2004 enlargement with the consequences of this extension, we can say that the extension was rather a success than a disappointment. This situation can be extrapolated to the new enlargement wave. There were no obstacles at the level of the communitarian institutions, in spite of the fears related to the increased number of clerk workers, the economic growth was more rapid in the Eastern zone than in the Euro zone, and immigration from the new EU members did not cause social instability in the Euro zone.

Of all the European approaches, the enlargement represented maybe the most successful product exported by the EU. Nevertheless, the desire to extend is more and more diminished in the European countries.¹⁸ The anxiety related to cultural integrity and national security is far too powerful to be able to convince the EU 15 citizens that the enlargement is a useful thing for Europe, especially if by extension we take into account not only Romania and Bulgaria, but also Turkey! Europe is transforming from an exporter of stability into an importer of instability, especially in the light of the international evolutions after 11th September 2001. The EU Eastern borders are becoming more and more unstable in the eyes of the Europeans, taking into account the economic, political and social situation from those countries and the fear that the new frontier-countries (Romania and Bulgaria) will not have the capacity to ensure an adequate border protection (in what Romania is concerned, its somehow privileged relations with the Moldavian Republic are considered a source of insecurity, taking into account the economic and political situation in this country).

Euroskepticism, one of the big enemies of the integration deepening, must not find its source in the new countries joining EU in 2007. In 2002, a Eurobarometre survey showed that 41% of European citizens did not want to find out more about the candidate countries, 76% did not want to live or reside in these countries, and 91% of them “felt no tie of any kind with them”¹⁹. This indifference or maybe negative attitude was contrasting with the support offered by the enlargement to the candidate countries. Both in the case of Romania and of Bulgaria we witness the same situation: the EU citizens’ support toward the new extension wave is even lower than the one for the 2004 extension, while the Romanians’ and the Bulgarians’ is very strong. The threat does not come only on behalf of the EU citizens. The ones from the recently become members of EU are manifesting a tendency of lowering their support for the European construction, especially because of the feeling that they are considered second rank citizens. This attitude is fueled by the differentiations in the “rights” acquired after joining EU. For the newcomers, the rules related to the free circulation of the workforce, the level of salaries or subventions are different. Even if these differences have an objective explanation concerning the lag of the recent or future member states behind the average EU 15, the citizens’ perception as being unwanted or considered “the poor country

¹⁸ Except for, maybe, Croatia, and this because its beautiful sea coast! (“*Is the EU losing the will to enlarge itself?*”, The Economist, April 2005, www.economist.com)

¹⁹ “*Is the EU losing the will to enlarge itself?*”, The Economist, April 2005, www.economist.com

relatives” creates a feeling of frustration which fuels the nationalist and extremist tendencies, that are extremely dangerous to the European security.

By way of conclusion, we believe that the European project of constructing a CFSP is only just beginning. Although there are numerous voices saying that the rejection of the constitutional treaty represents the compromising of CFSP’s future, we consider that it is only redefining itself. Europe has concentrated for almost half a century on the economic aspects of integration and succeeded to impose a certain model at an international level. Will it need the same amount of time to construct a common foreign security policy? There are sufficient specialists believing that Europe is facing an acute democratic deficit and, in this context, the leaders’ desire to progress in the field of the common foreign security policy is not shared by the majority of the population. The challenges brought forth by the Eastern enlargement, considering that the problems faced by the new and old members are socio-economically determined (unemployment, intolerance, ageing population), are challenges that need an EU solution as soon as possible.